Many of you probably have heard of Professor Joseph Nye, now of Harvard and former U.S. assistant secretary of defense. I remember him as the very persuasive advocate of the effectiveness of the exercise of soft power in international relations. He stressed that properly applied soft power in the form of nuanced diplomacy can be far more effective than in-your-face display of raw military might.
It is therefore most disappointing that in his latest analysis of Sino-U.S. relations, which he called a "turn for the worse," that he completely missed the mark. Nye blamed China for failing to toe the U.S. line of imposing sanction on Iran. He did mention President Obama's meeting with Dalai Lama and agreeing to sell arms to Taiwan as sources of friction in the bilateral relations but he seemed to believe that with ample prior precedents, China should be accepting and not get hot and bothered.
Nye also mentioned that "many American congressmen" complain about American jobs being destroyed by China's maintenance of an artificially low yuan, but he failed to point out the ludicrous premise such complaint is based. Instead he accuse Beijing of making a serious miscalculation because the U.S. is not in decline but still ranks as the second most competitive economy in the world, after Switzerland.
I am not sure how World Economic Forum, an organization based in the West, gage economic strength, but I am not as sanguine as Nye about America's future. I fear that America is about to become a failed state.
Take the health care standoff. I do not find members of Congress talk about what's in national interest. I find members working diligently to make sure the other side do not score any popularity points.
Thanks to a protective coddling of Wall Street, we experienced a great economic meltdown and have incurred trillions in national debt. Our only prospect of getting out of debt is prayer and a pig in the poke, hope for the best some hazy years down in the future. No one has the political courage to say we need to cut spending and (gasp) raise taxes. Obviously a major cut in spending is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan but we don't seem to know how to do that either.
Our collective aversion to paying taxes plus our preference for guns over books has led directly to a drive to bottom for our public education system, pioneered by California condemned to mediocrity with the enactment of Proposition 13. We are successful in not leaving "any child behind," instead just entire generations behind.
President Obama has said that we will pull out of the economic doldrums through an economy built on innovation. But where will future innovations come from, if we don't want immigrants, won't encourage foreign students to stay and depend on lousy schools to crank out poorly prepared graduates? On top of all that, we have a significant fraction of Americans that seriously believe the study of science is anti-Christ tantamount to devil worship.
Not to worry, some will say, because we have the strongest democracy in the world. Is that so? Thanks to the American invention known as gerrymandering (a manipulation of voting districts to favor a particular political party), members of state and national legislatures once elected are virtually guaranteed lifetime employment. To further enhance their job security, they raise money. The more the better. Once a politician wins an election, he or she immediately raises more campaign contributions because the politician knows full well that vulnerability is inversely proportional to the size of the campaign bank account.
America hasn’t been a democracy based on one person, one vote for decades. We used to go door to door campaigning for our candidates. No more, now we organize neighborhood gatherings for the purpose of collecting political contributions. America has become a democracy based on money. With rare exception, the one that raises the most money, wins. Guess what, most money come from special interest. Every politician rails against special interest—but, by the way, contributions gratefully accepted. Special interests love to make contributions because contributions get access and influence. Consequently, our politicians are not beholden to the voters, just the special interests.
Politicians are safe in their seats so long as they do not rock the boat. Thus they take the easy way out. Rather than exercise leadership and statesmanship and telling the American people of the hard tasks that lie ahead, they just blame China, for everything conceivable.
China in the meantime is building a network of high speed rail that will crisscross the country based on its own technology, i.e., not stolen from Los Alamos. They are proposing to build three trans-continental high speed rail systems: Two to Western Europe by way of Russia and central Asia and one south to Singapore.
China has the wealth to invest in infrastructure based on latest technology and they are sharing with their neighbors. The high speed rail will inevitably bring China closer to the community of nations that will share in the economic benefits. There may even come a day when bilateral relations with America will pale in importance compared to relations with rest of the world.
Nye reminded the readers that Deng Xiaoping would have “led China to the cooperative relations with the U.S. that marked the early of part of last year.” Alas, Nye did not seem to realize that it has been America that has changed from early last year and not China.
Monday, March 15, 2010
Sunday, February 7, 2010
Obama needs another playbook for China
Recent geopolitical activity suggests that President Obama is playing his China cards in a traditional way set by his predecessors, but we need to ask whether those cards are still valid.
President Obama came into office last year facing the biggest financial crisis since the Great Depression. He knew he had to take swift and drastic actions and he did. He also knew he had to change the international image of the United States to a more humble and gentle one, and in concert with Secretary of State Clinton, he was largely successful.
In particular he dispensed with the usual antagonistic confrontations that his predecessor administrations indulged at the beginning of their relations with China. Instead he stressed the importance of collaboration between Beijing and Washington in solving the many challenges facing both nations.
Secretary Clinton’s first trip abroad after taking office was to China and she said all the right things. Secretaries Chu and Locke visited China more than once in the first year, partly because of the importance of their portfolios (energy and commerce) to the bilateral relations and partly because their ethnic Chinese background is regarded as useful for building goodwill. Defense Secretary Gates made overtures for military exchanges that China accepted and the relations between the Pentagon and the People’s Liberation Army began to warm.
Of course, as we would expect between the debtor and the creditor holding most of the notes payable, Treasury Secretary Geithner has devoted more face and phone time with Chinese officials than any other cabinet officer. He had to work hard to assure his counterparts in Beijing that the United States would control the deficit and protect the value of the dollar so that China would have reasons not only to hold onto the trillions of IOUs but would continue to buy Treasury notes and bills in the future.
For some reason the dynamics between the two countries changed after Obama came back from his trip to China in November. Since then the collegiality has been replaced by increasingly strident exchange of words, threats and counter threats. Obama’s administration has demanded that China revalue their Renminbi and open their market. Obama has announced the intent to sell arms to Taiwan and to meet Dalai Lama. It’s almost as if Obama had planned to build up a cache of goodwill with China in order to spend it in the second year.
Piling on is Pentagon’s latest Quadrennial Defense Review where they discussed potential military threats from China. Despite the protestations to the contrary, the U.S. military continue to look at China through cold war lens. They are obsessed with the "lack of transparency and the nature of China's military development and decision-making processes." They are fixated on the need to understand China’s military capability and intentions and to be able to measure against America’s own.
China on the other hand is unlikely to oblige. According to the Art of War, the classic tome on strategy written by Sun Zi, the weaker power will always cloak in deception and ambiguity and hide one’s vulnerabilities. The U.S. may have nothing but altruistic intentions in wishing to know China’s strength and plans, but it is not in China’s self-interest to make it easy for the U.S. to sleep at nights—certainly not when the U.S. comes across with so much hostility.
No one outside of Obama’s team can really know what prompted the White House to change. One obvious explanation is that with domestic political setbacks such as the loss of Ted Kennedy’s Senatorial seat as well as other potential losses looming, Obama felt the need to strengthen his ties to his core constituency, a key part of his support being well established China bashers.
If so, it would be disappointing because Obama should have the intelligence to see and the courage to tell the people of the United States that blaming the valuation of the Renminbi will not bring jobs back home—low paying jobs that nobody wanted for decades. Furthermore, since the financial crisis the bilateral relationship has undergone a fundamental change. China no longer sees itself as the 95 pound weakling that needs to absorb a periodic pummeling just to tag along and hang around with the big bully.
Having seen how China weathered the financial storm relatively unscathed, the people of China now believe that they have a system that works better than the West and they expected to be treated with the respect of a peer and not dismissed as a junior flunky. Right or wrong, this is increasingly their attitude. Given that, China’s leaders could hardly be seen to back down before hard nose demands from Washington.
Unilateral actions such as arms sales to Taiwan and meeting the Dalai Lama are particularly sensitive issues because China views those acts as direct interference into their internal affairs. In the past, Beijing might protest for a while and then let it fade away. This may no longer be possible because the Chinese now have heightened expectations consistent with their new self image. Their announced intention to impose sanctions on companies that participates in arms sales to Taiwan reflect the desire to back up rhetoric with real punishing consequences.
Similarly the confrontation over the valuation of the yuan could lead to mutually assured destruction of both economies with devastating global impact. Since a strengthening of the Renminbi is equivalent to a devaluation of the dollars in China’s possession, if backed to a corner, they may decide to walk away from supporting the dollar rather than be seen to acquiesce and do something against their own interest. Most recently, Vice Premier Wang Qishan rather ominously told Geithner not to bother making another trip to Beijing to explain the same tired U.S. position.
I hope cooler heads in Washington prevail before we get too close to the brink. As one columnist in Wall Street Journal recently asked, “How many enemies do we need?”
An edited version was posted on New America Media.
President Obama came into office last year facing the biggest financial crisis since the Great Depression. He knew he had to take swift and drastic actions and he did. He also knew he had to change the international image of the United States to a more humble and gentle one, and in concert with Secretary of State Clinton, he was largely successful.
In particular he dispensed with the usual antagonistic confrontations that his predecessor administrations indulged at the beginning of their relations with China. Instead he stressed the importance of collaboration between Beijing and Washington in solving the many challenges facing both nations.
Secretary Clinton’s first trip abroad after taking office was to China and she said all the right things. Secretaries Chu and Locke visited China more than once in the first year, partly because of the importance of their portfolios (energy and commerce) to the bilateral relations and partly because their ethnic Chinese background is regarded as useful for building goodwill. Defense Secretary Gates made overtures for military exchanges that China accepted and the relations between the Pentagon and the People’s Liberation Army began to warm.
Of course, as we would expect between the debtor and the creditor holding most of the notes payable, Treasury Secretary Geithner has devoted more face and phone time with Chinese officials than any other cabinet officer. He had to work hard to assure his counterparts in Beijing that the United States would control the deficit and protect the value of the dollar so that China would have reasons not only to hold onto the trillions of IOUs but would continue to buy Treasury notes and bills in the future.
For some reason the dynamics between the two countries changed after Obama came back from his trip to China in November. Since then the collegiality has been replaced by increasingly strident exchange of words, threats and counter threats. Obama’s administration has demanded that China revalue their Renminbi and open their market. Obama has announced the intent to sell arms to Taiwan and to meet Dalai Lama. It’s almost as if Obama had planned to build up a cache of goodwill with China in order to spend it in the second year.
Piling on is Pentagon’s latest Quadrennial Defense Review where they discussed potential military threats from China. Despite the protestations to the contrary, the U.S. military continue to look at China through cold war lens. They are obsessed with the "lack of transparency and the nature of China's military development and decision-making processes." They are fixated on the need to understand China’s military capability and intentions and to be able to measure against America’s own.
China on the other hand is unlikely to oblige. According to the Art of War, the classic tome on strategy written by Sun Zi, the weaker power will always cloak in deception and ambiguity and hide one’s vulnerabilities. The U.S. may have nothing but altruistic intentions in wishing to know China’s strength and plans, but it is not in China’s self-interest to make it easy for the U.S. to sleep at nights—certainly not when the U.S. comes across with so much hostility.
No one outside of Obama’s team can really know what prompted the White House to change. One obvious explanation is that with domestic political setbacks such as the loss of Ted Kennedy’s Senatorial seat as well as other potential losses looming, Obama felt the need to strengthen his ties to his core constituency, a key part of his support being well established China bashers.
If so, it would be disappointing because Obama should have the intelligence to see and the courage to tell the people of the United States that blaming the valuation of the Renminbi will not bring jobs back home—low paying jobs that nobody wanted for decades. Furthermore, since the financial crisis the bilateral relationship has undergone a fundamental change. China no longer sees itself as the 95 pound weakling that needs to absorb a periodic pummeling just to tag along and hang around with the big bully.
Having seen how China weathered the financial storm relatively unscathed, the people of China now believe that they have a system that works better than the West and they expected to be treated with the respect of a peer and not dismissed as a junior flunky. Right or wrong, this is increasingly their attitude. Given that, China’s leaders could hardly be seen to back down before hard nose demands from Washington.
Unilateral actions such as arms sales to Taiwan and meeting the Dalai Lama are particularly sensitive issues because China views those acts as direct interference into their internal affairs. In the past, Beijing might protest for a while and then let it fade away. This may no longer be possible because the Chinese now have heightened expectations consistent with their new self image. Their announced intention to impose sanctions on companies that participates in arms sales to Taiwan reflect the desire to back up rhetoric with real punishing consequences.
Similarly the confrontation over the valuation of the yuan could lead to mutually assured destruction of both economies with devastating global impact. Since a strengthening of the Renminbi is equivalent to a devaluation of the dollars in China’s possession, if backed to a corner, they may decide to walk away from supporting the dollar rather than be seen to acquiesce and do something against their own interest. Most recently, Vice Premier Wang Qishan rather ominously told Geithner not to bother making another trip to Beijing to explain the same tired U.S. position.
I hope cooler heads in Washington prevail before we get too close to the brink. As one columnist in Wall Street Journal recently asked, “How many enemies do we need?”
An edited version was posted on New America Media.
Thursday, February 4, 2010
Arms sales adds complexity to the U.S.-China-Taiwan Triangle
President Obama’s announcement to sell $6.4 billion of arms to Taiwan seems to have caught China by surprise. Some in Washington see Beijing’s reaction as a normal response when the U.S. raises the tension in the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle while others are not so sure.
One thing is clear, however. Obama does not have the luxury of starting a confrontation with China. Many argued that coming into office facing the tsunami of a financial crisis, Obama needed China’s support of the dollar by continuing to buy and holding on to treasury notes. A soft, non-confrontational approach was the only way.
Thus Obama’s decision to sell arms to Taiwan can be read in at least two different ways. One is that Obama has established great rapport with the leaders of Beijing as a result of his November trip to China and arms sales was among the many subjects discussed, and that Obama’s announcement and Beijing’s response are orchestrated. In fact, some academicians inside China have been quoted as saying that Beijing’s official protest is for domestic consumption.
The other interpretation is that Obama’s trip to China was a failure as he did not come back with specific agreements that could be counted as wins. Obama, therefore, has decided to send the message that he, too, can play hardball. By offering only Black Hawk helicopters and Patriot missiles, but withholding advanced fighters and submarines, he is seen as saving a heavier punch for the future, in case he needs to ratchet up the tension by another notch.
This view, while fitting with the inclination of more hawkish analysts in Washington, seems to fly in face of what Obama has demonstrated from the oval office, namely, an intelligent leader who makes thoughtful and rational decisions. Furthermore, he continues to need China’s cooperation not only in the international arena such as Iran and North Korea but also to keep holding onto to the dollar. A confrontation with China does not seem to be in our national interest.
Official spokespersons from Washington justify the arms sales as a U.S. obligation “to ensure Taiwan’s self-defense capability.” This claim is a bit of an exaggeration. Compared to Taiwan, China has more than eight times the military personnel, five times more fighter aircrafts and 15 times more submarines, not to mention the thousands of missiles pointing at Taiwan. A few squadrons of helicopters are not going to tip the scale. (See a PLA analyst commenting on Taiwan's military.)
Obama’s announcement, coming on the heels of Taiwan president Ma Ying-jeou’s highly publicized diplomatic swing through Central America, including two transit stops in San Francisco and Los Angeles -- a privilege never accorded his predecessor -- is a win for Ma and probably intended for Taiwan’s internal consumption.
So the third interpretation of the arms sales and the following brouhaha can be read as staged for the benefit of the domestic audiences of all three countries in the trilateral relations. Ma’s political opposition has been attacking him for being soft on the mainland and leaving Taiwan defenseless. He can now claim to hold a stronger hand while he continues to engage Beijing on economic cooperation. Of course, Taiwan politics being what it is, the opposition is now complaining that the United State’s offer sets the price for the arms as much as 40% above market value.
Both Obama and Ma (in China they are referred to as two horses, “ma” being the word for horse) are hurting in their home approval ratings. While China’s President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao are not subject to popularity polls, strong approval at home is important to their ability to govern as well. Beijing’s pledged to retaliate against companies involved in the arms sale, no doubt, will make them popular at the home front.
It was only one administration ago that the White House spoke of containment of China. A significant part of the Washington establishment continues to regard China as an adversary. Selling arms to Taiwan may be politically necessary in response to domestic pressures, but such an announcement and possible future meetings with the Dalai Lama are not going to win China over as a partner in solving international crises.
Eventually, Obama will have to make up his mind whether to treat China as a friend or as a non-aligned third party, if not an outright adversary. A positive trip to China followed by offsetting moves on controversial issues such as arms sales to Taiwan will not accomplish the goal of gaining China as a valuable ally. And given the arrays of problems he is facing, Obama needs all the help he can get.
The above published by New America Media.
One thing is clear, however. Obama does not have the luxury of starting a confrontation with China. Many argued that coming into office facing the tsunami of a financial crisis, Obama needed China’s support of the dollar by continuing to buy and holding on to treasury notes. A soft, non-confrontational approach was the only way.
Thus Obama’s decision to sell arms to Taiwan can be read in at least two different ways. One is that Obama has established great rapport with the leaders of Beijing as a result of his November trip to China and arms sales was among the many subjects discussed, and that Obama’s announcement and Beijing’s response are orchestrated. In fact, some academicians inside China have been quoted as saying that Beijing’s official protest is for domestic consumption.
The other interpretation is that Obama’s trip to China was a failure as he did not come back with specific agreements that could be counted as wins. Obama, therefore, has decided to send the message that he, too, can play hardball. By offering only Black Hawk helicopters and Patriot missiles, but withholding advanced fighters and submarines, he is seen as saving a heavier punch for the future, in case he needs to ratchet up the tension by another notch.
This view, while fitting with the inclination of more hawkish analysts in Washington, seems to fly in face of what Obama has demonstrated from the oval office, namely, an intelligent leader who makes thoughtful and rational decisions. Furthermore, he continues to need China’s cooperation not only in the international arena such as Iran and North Korea but also to keep holding onto to the dollar. A confrontation with China does not seem to be in our national interest.
Official spokespersons from Washington justify the arms sales as a U.S. obligation “to ensure Taiwan’s self-defense capability.” This claim is a bit of an exaggeration. Compared to Taiwan, China has more than eight times the military personnel, five times more fighter aircrafts and 15 times more submarines, not to mention the thousands of missiles pointing at Taiwan. A few squadrons of helicopters are not going to tip the scale. (See a PLA analyst commenting on Taiwan's military.)
Obama’s announcement, coming on the heels of Taiwan president Ma Ying-jeou’s highly publicized diplomatic swing through Central America, including two transit stops in San Francisco and Los Angeles -- a privilege never accorded his predecessor -- is a win for Ma and probably intended for Taiwan’s internal consumption.
So the third interpretation of the arms sales and the following brouhaha can be read as staged for the benefit of the domestic audiences of all three countries in the trilateral relations. Ma’s political opposition has been attacking him for being soft on the mainland and leaving Taiwan defenseless. He can now claim to hold a stronger hand while he continues to engage Beijing on economic cooperation. Of course, Taiwan politics being what it is, the opposition is now complaining that the United State’s offer sets the price for the arms as much as 40% above market value.
Both Obama and Ma (in China they are referred to as two horses, “ma” being the word for horse) are hurting in their home approval ratings. While China’s President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao are not subject to popularity polls, strong approval at home is important to their ability to govern as well. Beijing’s pledged to retaliate against companies involved in the arms sale, no doubt, will make them popular at the home front.
It was only one administration ago that the White House spoke of containment of China. A significant part of the Washington establishment continues to regard China as an adversary. Selling arms to Taiwan may be politically necessary in response to domestic pressures, but such an announcement and possible future meetings with the Dalai Lama are not going to win China over as a partner in solving international crises.
Eventually, Obama will have to make up his mind whether to treat China as a friend or as a non-aligned third party, if not an outright adversary. A positive trip to China followed by offsetting moves on controversial issues such as arms sales to Taiwan will not accomplish the goal of gaining China as a valuable ally. And given the arrays of problems he is facing, Obama needs all the help he can get.
The above published by New America Media.
Saturday, January 30, 2010
Banana Republics and the U.S.
It would be overly harsh to say that the Central American countries are failed states. Based on two weeks touring through Belize, El Salvador, Honduras and mostly Guatemala, it may be too presumptuous to make any definitive conclusions but one cannot avoid the impression that these countries do not function very well.
Everywhere our tourist bus went in Guatemala, the national tourist police in massive black 4-wheel drive vehicles shadowed us. Although these visibly armed escorts were at the invitation of our tour guide, the need for their presence in order to reassure the tourists was, in itself, not too comforting.
We were taken to see schools in the hills. Despite entitlement of free public education to everyone up to 8th grade, we learned that the funds allocated to the school were dissipated along the way by leakage to greedy pockets of officials and very little reach the intended destination.
On the shore of Lake Atitlan, we saw a beautiful estate with its own heliport. On the outskirts of Guatemala City we saw districts of tin shacks and mud hovels. If there was any doubt, the diminutive, clearly undernourished Mayan women hawking their handicraft on the streets confirmed the existence of a great unequal distribution of wealth.
All the countries on our itinerary seemed to share a common characteristic, namely, a small wealthy ruling class of European stock and a vast general population of underclass consisted varying shades of darker skin tones. The ruling class has not shown any inclination to advance the economy of their nation by improving the lives and therefore productivity of their people.
Rather, the ruling class seemed to depend on suppressing the potential of their general population as their way of staying on top, politically and economically. Inevitably, this means the need to control the populace via the military resorting to customary tools of brutality. Inevitably the people rebelled with bloody consequences.
The governments promptly informed Washington that the ensuing civil war was actually counterinsurgency against leftist guerillas trained by the Cubans. Reflexively, Washington sent arms and local conflicts become massive conflagrations. People, many in the professional class with critical skills, emigrated out of their home country and another banana republic was born.
While these destructive internal conflicts have been resolved a decade or so ago, the surviving governments have not found their way to a more effective and perhaps enlightened rule. Most of the poor continued to be trapped in their cycle of poverty and seemingly no prospects for a better life.
One can argue that the America is becoming more like a banana republic than these Central American states becoming more like free and open societies that the United States once was. In America, power is now concentrated in the rich who can make big campaign contributions. The governments, local, state and federal, are doing increasing less for schools and students in the ghettoes are condemned to a future without hope.
Of course, the main reason for touring Central America was to learn about the ancient Mayan civilization. We learned that Mayan were very hierarchal with clear separation of classes and professions. One guide even suggested that the Mayan royalty practiced close kin marriages in order to breed giants as a distinction between royal class and the (figuratively) lowly commoners—and most Mayans were quite short, well under 5 feet in stature.
I suspect the use of complicated hieroglyphic form of writing was also consistent with a culture that prized privileges and exclusivity. The complexity was a way of keeping the ability to read from being widespread and limited to the handful in the learned class. Whether its astronomy or calendar or religious ceremony, the Mayans seemed to thrive on enveloping everything in mystery and secrecy.
Perhaps the very restriction of knowledge to only a handful of people in each generation ultimately led to the extinction of the culture when some miscalculation or accident snuffed out heirs to carry on the traditions.
Everywhere our tourist bus went in Guatemala, the national tourist police in massive black 4-wheel drive vehicles shadowed us. Although these visibly armed escorts were at the invitation of our tour guide, the need for their presence in order to reassure the tourists was, in itself, not too comforting.
We were taken to see schools in the hills. Despite entitlement of free public education to everyone up to 8th grade, we learned that the funds allocated to the school were dissipated along the way by leakage to greedy pockets of officials and very little reach the intended destination.
On the shore of Lake Atitlan, we saw a beautiful estate with its own heliport. On the outskirts of Guatemala City we saw districts of tin shacks and mud hovels. If there was any doubt, the diminutive, clearly undernourished Mayan women hawking their handicraft on the streets confirmed the existence of a great unequal distribution of wealth.
All the countries on our itinerary seemed to share a common characteristic, namely, a small wealthy ruling class of European stock and a vast general population of underclass consisted varying shades of darker skin tones. The ruling class has not shown any inclination to advance the economy of their nation by improving the lives and therefore productivity of their people.
Rather, the ruling class seemed to depend on suppressing the potential of their general population as their way of staying on top, politically and economically. Inevitably, this means the need to control the populace via the military resorting to customary tools of brutality. Inevitably the people rebelled with bloody consequences.
The governments promptly informed Washington that the ensuing civil war was actually counterinsurgency against leftist guerillas trained by the Cubans. Reflexively, Washington sent arms and local conflicts become massive conflagrations. People, many in the professional class with critical skills, emigrated out of their home country and another banana republic was born.
While these destructive internal conflicts have been resolved a decade or so ago, the surviving governments have not found their way to a more effective and perhaps enlightened rule. Most of the poor continued to be trapped in their cycle of poverty and seemingly no prospects for a better life.
One can argue that the America is becoming more like a banana republic than these Central American states becoming more like free and open societies that the United States once was. In America, power is now concentrated in the rich who can make big campaign contributions. The governments, local, state and federal, are doing increasing less for schools and students in the ghettoes are condemned to a future without hope.
Of course, the main reason for touring Central America was to learn about the ancient Mayan civilization. We learned that Mayan were very hierarchal with clear separation of classes and professions. One guide even suggested that the Mayan royalty practiced close kin marriages in order to breed giants as a distinction between royal class and the (figuratively) lowly commoners—and most Mayans were quite short, well under 5 feet in stature.
I suspect the use of complicated hieroglyphic form of writing was also consistent with a culture that prized privileges and exclusivity. The complexity was a way of keeping the ability to read from being widespread and limited to the handful in the learned class. Whether its astronomy or calendar or religious ceremony, the Mayans seemed to thrive on enveloping everything in mystery and secrecy.
Perhaps the very restriction of knowledge to only a handful of people in each generation ultimately led to the extinction of the culture when some miscalculation or accident snuffed out heirs to carry on the traditions.
Saturday, November 14, 2009
Obama's Visit to China
U.S. president Barack Obama has begun his one week, four-country visit to Asia. That about half of that time will be spent in China is a measure of the importance of this bilateral relationship.
From the outset of his office, Obama dispensed with the customary China-bashing and immediately declared the need for a strong bilateral relation with China in order to tackle the many problems that confront the world, not least the economic downturn, climate change, nuclear proliferation, and counterterrorism.
The actions of his administration followed his rhetoric. His two Chinese American cabinet secretaries, Steven Chu (Energy) and Gary Locke (Commerce), were among the first high ranking officials to visit Beijing and began the dialogue on collaboration. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton’s first trip after taking office was to China, Defense Secretary Robert Gates has also made an official visit and Treasury Secretary Tom Geithner has been to China more than once.
Obama’s actions have brought results. China’s premier Wen Jiabao went to North Korea and came back to report that Pyongyang was ready to re-enter the six party talks, subject to the U.S. being willing to conduct direct bilateral discussions. In response the White House has announced the intention to send special envoy Stephen Bosworth to Pyongyang. This is a refreshing change from the unilateral approach of the previous Bush administration.
Recently Xu Caihou, vice chairman of China’s Central Military Commission visited the U.S. hosted by Secretary Gates. As part of his 11-day visit, Xu was taken to sensitive military sites including the Strategic Command Headquarter in a show of desire for closer cooperation. The result was seven points of consensus that will serve as a blueprint for closer military cooperation and exchanges.
Beijing has been making a fuss over recent remarks by Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg relating to “strategic reassurance” between the parties as part of the road to closer partnership. China views this development as an elevation of the importance of the relationship. Zhou Wenzhong, China’s ambassador to Washington remarked that he has witnessed the bilateral tie evolving from one of frequent tensions to one of extensive cooperation.
In light of the warming bilateral relations, what can we expect out of Obama’s meetings with Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao in Beijing? They certainly have a lot to talk about. China would love to hear Obama declare unequivocally that Taiwan and Tibet are part of China. Obama probably would ask for more assurances on arms control and non-proliferation and more military transparency and cooperation.
While both sides profess to be against protectionism, China would want Obama’s assurance that he would not yield to the domestic protectionist pressures despite his declarations to the contrary. Obama would like China to strengthen the value of the Renminbi against the dollar. China might ask about the granting market economy status which China has received from over 90 countries; the status lessens trade disputes.
The most likely agreement to come out of Beijing, I believe, is some kind of declaration on climate change that would allow both nations to attend the December climate summit in Copenhagen with some appearance of a united front.
Most specific agreements take many working level bilateral meetings to hammer out the details. Unless these meetings have already been taking place, more specific announcements are unlikely to come from Obama’s visit. The most would be agreement on a working framework that would allow negotiations to proceed. Indeed, declaration for a framework for closer cooperation was the result of an April meeting between Obama and Hu Jintao which led to the subsequent series of positive developments.
The young people in Shanghai are excited by Obama’s plan to begin his China visit with an open town hall Q&A with them in the audience. Obama has been accorded rock star appeal among the youth of China “because he embodies the personality and character of a leader to whom young people feel they can relate to as opposed to some stern-faced Chinese officials they have learned to dread”—a quote from one of the Chinese commentators.
Bill Clinton made his greatest impact on China when he visited China after his presidency. On national TV, he put his arms around a young man afflicted with AIDS. This image changed China’s attitude about AIDS victims and Wen Jiabao was later seen shaking hands with AIDS patients.
Perhaps the greatest legacy from Obama’s visit is to turn the stern faces of Chinese officials into friendlier demeanors. The Chinese people would remember Obama for a long time if that change is to come about.
See edited version of this commentary in New America Media.
From the outset of his office, Obama dispensed with the customary China-bashing and immediately declared the need for a strong bilateral relation with China in order to tackle the many problems that confront the world, not least the economic downturn, climate change, nuclear proliferation, and counterterrorism.
The actions of his administration followed his rhetoric. His two Chinese American cabinet secretaries, Steven Chu (Energy) and Gary Locke (Commerce), were among the first high ranking officials to visit Beijing and began the dialogue on collaboration. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton’s first trip after taking office was to China, Defense Secretary Robert Gates has also made an official visit and Treasury Secretary Tom Geithner has been to China more than once.
Obama’s actions have brought results. China’s premier Wen Jiabao went to North Korea and came back to report that Pyongyang was ready to re-enter the six party talks, subject to the U.S. being willing to conduct direct bilateral discussions. In response the White House has announced the intention to send special envoy Stephen Bosworth to Pyongyang. This is a refreshing change from the unilateral approach of the previous Bush administration.
Recently Xu Caihou, vice chairman of China’s Central Military Commission visited the U.S. hosted by Secretary Gates. As part of his 11-day visit, Xu was taken to sensitive military sites including the Strategic Command Headquarter in a show of desire for closer cooperation. The result was seven points of consensus that will serve as a blueprint for closer military cooperation and exchanges.
Beijing has been making a fuss over recent remarks by Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg relating to “strategic reassurance” between the parties as part of the road to closer partnership. China views this development as an elevation of the importance of the relationship. Zhou Wenzhong, China’s ambassador to Washington remarked that he has witnessed the bilateral tie evolving from one of frequent tensions to one of extensive cooperation.
In light of the warming bilateral relations, what can we expect out of Obama’s meetings with Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao in Beijing? They certainly have a lot to talk about. China would love to hear Obama declare unequivocally that Taiwan and Tibet are part of China. Obama probably would ask for more assurances on arms control and non-proliferation and more military transparency and cooperation.
While both sides profess to be against protectionism, China would want Obama’s assurance that he would not yield to the domestic protectionist pressures despite his declarations to the contrary. Obama would like China to strengthen the value of the Renminbi against the dollar. China might ask about the granting market economy status which China has received from over 90 countries; the status lessens trade disputes.
The most likely agreement to come out of Beijing, I believe, is some kind of declaration on climate change that would allow both nations to attend the December climate summit in Copenhagen with some appearance of a united front.
Most specific agreements take many working level bilateral meetings to hammer out the details. Unless these meetings have already been taking place, more specific announcements are unlikely to come from Obama’s visit. The most would be agreement on a working framework that would allow negotiations to proceed. Indeed, declaration for a framework for closer cooperation was the result of an April meeting between Obama and Hu Jintao which led to the subsequent series of positive developments.
The young people in Shanghai are excited by Obama’s plan to begin his China visit with an open town hall Q&A with them in the audience. Obama has been accorded rock star appeal among the youth of China “because he embodies the personality and character of a leader to whom young people feel they can relate to as opposed to some stern-faced Chinese officials they have learned to dread”—a quote from one of the Chinese commentators.
Bill Clinton made his greatest impact on China when he visited China after his presidency. On national TV, he put his arms around a young man afflicted with AIDS. This image changed China’s attitude about AIDS victims and Wen Jiabao was later seen shaking hands with AIDS patients.
Perhaps the greatest legacy from Obama’s visit is to turn the stern faces of Chinese officials into friendlier demeanors. The Chinese people would remember Obama for a long time if that change is to come about.
See edited version of this commentary in New America Media.
Wednesday, November 11, 2009
The Uyghurs and China
Mr. Kasim Tuman, Council Member, Uyghur Association of America was one of the speakers at a seminar on "Ethnicity and Identity in Xinjiang" held at Stanford. My wife and I have been to Xinjiang, in particular to Kashgar where Mr. Tuman came from, and naturally we were interested in what he had to say.
I was struck by some of Mr. Tuman's statements. Since the forum did not offer an opportunity for a real dialogue and discussion, I thought I would offer some counterpoints and observations in response to what I heard.
Tuman said: The Uyghurs are not interested in mixing with the Chinese for fear of losing their cultural identity. They fear being assimilated by the Chinese culture.
My response would have been: Cultures are not static but dynamic and are subject to influences and stimulus especially from other neighboring cultures. Cultures that do not evolve and remain static become endangered and face extinction with time. The Xianbeis, one of many forefathers of the Uyghurs, used to rule northern China, known in Chinese history as the Northern Wei dynasty. They admired the Han Chinese culture so much that they adopted Chinese customs, language and many social and political practices. Indeed the Xianbeis did get assimilated and their own culture became lost to history. But I do not see anything unnatural about this outcome. If people no longer accept or willing to adopt certain cultural values and practices, that culture will fade away.
Cultures can also disappear on the point of the sword. Genghis Khan so thoroughly decimated the Tangut kingdom (Xixia in Chinese), another contributor to the Uyghur gene pool, that there is no trace of the Tangut culture remain. The meaning of their writing is lost as is their historical records. The propagation of Islam was also accomplished by military conquest as the religion spread from the Middle East westward to Spain and eastward to the Indonesian archipelago imposing the Islamic religion on the local people and replacing the previous ways of worship.
But use of force has not been how the Chinese culture has proliferated. Non-Chinese people adopted certain aspects of the Chinese culture that they found more appealing than their own. One can see evidence of the influence of Chinese culture in South Asia, Southeast Asia as well as Korea and Japan. These people were not forced to adopt Chinese manners and practices; they willingly did so.
In an attempt to distinguish the Chinese culture from the Uyghur, Mr. Tuman said that it is very much in the Chinese culture for the young people to study hard and strive to attend the best school and best university and to work hard and make a lot of money. This is not part of the Uyghur culture, he said, as the Uyghurs like to take life as it comes. He used a map from Wikipedia as a platform for his talk. I noticed from the same Wiki article, one of the characteristics attributed ancestors of Uyghurs was "they showed greed without restraint, for they often made their living by looting." Perhaps given that heritage, it is understandable why Mr. Tuman made that distinction between the Uyghur and the Chinese culture.
The map from Wikipedia showed a Uyghur Khaganate that at one moment in history spread from western part of today's Manchuria westward to nearly the Caspian Sea. Mr. Tuman seemed to imply that the Uyghur people has had a long continuous history since as early as 4th century AD. But a close reading of the Wiki article would reveal that there was no such continuity but the Uyghur state, when it existed at all, ebb and flowed with time. With mostly nomads as ancesters, it is understandable that continuity would have been difficult and any sort of ethnic purity and identity even more improbable.
On the one hand, Mr. Tumen assured the audience that the Uyghur culture is quite distinct and unique and no way related to the Chinese culture. On the other, he said that he has learned the value of cultural diversity since he came to the United States nine years ago. I believe China also recognized the value of diversity. Beijing government's policy is to allow the fifty plus ethnic minorities to teach their own language alongside putonghua in their schools and to enjoy certain levels of local autonomy in maintaining their daily lives and traditions. Of course, if the minority wish to succeed in a Chinese dominated economy, that person must also learn Chinese and understand how to operate in a Chinese society. This is no different from an ethnic minority living in America. That person can no more succeed in the U.S. if the person is unable or unwilling to communicate in English.
Mr. Tumen seemed to believe that in a democracy like the U.S., the Uyghur culture can thrive. Apparently he has not been in America long enough to understand what happened to the many different forms of native American cultures that have been obliterated by actual acts of genocide.
Mr. Tumen also stated that there are 20 million Uyghurs living outside China, implying that they were originally from China. This implication is most misleading. Uyghurs are not just native to the Xinjiang Automomous Region but also in nearby Central Asian countries. If there is a Uyghur diaspora of 20 million, somebody needs to clarify as to what portion have their roots in China and what portion from outside of China.
When we visited Xinjiang, we learned a little about the colorful Uyghur dress, beautifully crafted music instruments to accompany the Uyghur music and dance, Uyghur food and how Uyghur kids are raised. We were not there long enough to detect any racial tension or alienation. After visiting many parts of China with autonomous regions belonging to various enthinic minorities, we did get the impression that the Chinese government is trying hard to be a nation for all ethnicities. Go to here for further discussion of ethnic minorities in China.
I was struck by some of Mr. Tuman's statements. Since the forum did not offer an opportunity for a real dialogue and discussion, I thought I would offer some counterpoints and observations in response to what I heard.
Tuman said: The Uyghurs are not interested in mixing with the Chinese for fear of losing their cultural identity. They fear being assimilated by the Chinese culture.
My response would have been: Cultures are not static but dynamic and are subject to influences and stimulus especially from other neighboring cultures. Cultures that do not evolve and remain static become endangered and face extinction with time. The Xianbeis, one of many forefathers of the Uyghurs, used to rule northern China, known in Chinese history as the Northern Wei dynasty. They admired the Han Chinese culture so much that they adopted Chinese customs, language and many social and political practices. Indeed the Xianbeis did get assimilated and their own culture became lost to history. But I do not see anything unnatural about this outcome. If people no longer accept or willing to adopt certain cultural values and practices, that culture will fade away.
Cultures can also disappear on the point of the sword. Genghis Khan so thoroughly decimated the Tangut kingdom (Xixia in Chinese), another contributor to the Uyghur gene pool, that there is no trace of the Tangut culture remain. The meaning of their writing is lost as is their historical records. The propagation of Islam was also accomplished by military conquest as the religion spread from the Middle East westward to Spain and eastward to the Indonesian archipelago imposing the Islamic religion on the local people and replacing the previous ways of worship.
But use of force has not been how the Chinese culture has proliferated. Non-Chinese people adopted certain aspects of the Chinese culture that they found more appealing than their own. One can see evidence of the influence of Chinese culture in South Asia, Southeast Asia as well as Korea and Japan. These people were not forced to adopt Chinese manners and practices; they willingly did so.
In an attempt to distinguish the Chinese culture from the Uyghur, Mr. Tuman said that it is very much in the Chinese culture for the young people to study hard and strive to attend the best school and best university and to work hard and make a lot of money. This is not part of the Uyghur culture, he said, as the Uyghurs like to take life as it comes. He used a map from Wikipedia as a platform for his talk. I noticed from the same Wiki article, one of the characteristics attributed ancestors of Uyghurs was "they showed greed without restraint, for they often made their living by looting." Perhaps given that heritage, it is understandable why Mr. Tuman made that distinction between the Uyghur and the Chinese culture.
The map from Wikipedia showed a Uyghur Khaganate that at one moment in history spread from western part of today's Manchuria westward to nearly the Caspian Sea. Mr. Tuman seemed to imply that the Uyghur people has had a long continuous history since as early as 4th century AD. But a close reading of the Wiki article would reveal that there was no such continuity but the Uyghur state, when it existed at all, ebb and flowed with time. With mostly nomads as ancesters, it is understandable that continuity would have been difficult and any sort of ethnic purity and identity even more improbable.
On the one hand, Mr. Tumen assured the audience that the Uyghur culture is quite distinct and unique and no way related to the Chinese culture. On the other, he said that he has learned the value of cultural diversity since he came to the United States nine years ago. I believe China also recognized the value of diversity. Beijing government's policy is to allow the fifty plus ethnic minorities to teach their own language alongside putonghua in their schools and to enjoy certain levels of local autonomy in maintaining their daily lives and traditions. Of course, if the minority wish to succeed in a Chinese dominated economy, that person must also learn Chinese and understand how to operate in a Chinese society. This is no different from an ethnic minority living in America. That person can no more succeed in the U.S. if the person is unable or unwilling to communicate in English.
Mr. Tumen seemed to believe that in a democracy like the U.S., the Uyghur culture can thrive. Apparently he has not been in America long enough to understand what happened to the many different forms of native American cultures that have been obliterated by actual acts of genocide.
Mr. Tumen also stated that there are 20 million Uyghurs living outside China, implying that they were originally from China. This implication is most misleading. Uyghurs are not just native to the Xinjiang Automomous Region but also in nearby Central Asian countries. If there is a Uyghur diaspora of 20 million, somebody needs to clarify as to what portion have their roots in China and what portion from outside of China.
When we visited Xinjiang, we learned a little about the colorful Uyghur dress, beautifully crafted music instruments to accompany the Uyghur music and dance, Uyghur food and how Uyghur kids are raised. We were not there long enough to detect any racial tension or alienation. After visiting many parts of China with autonomous regions belonging to various enthinic minorities, we did get the impression that the Chinese government is trying hard to be a nation for all ethnicities. Go to here for further discussion of ethnic minorities in China.
Saturday, October 24, 2009
Looming tension between India and China
Recent developments on the borders between China and India hint at rising tension between the two giants. Most reports and commentaries portray China as the aggressor and India as the aggrieved state defending its national interest. These developments will bear close monitoring in the months to come.
Most frequently, the cause of the border disputes is traced back to the border conflict fought between China and India in 1962, invariably portraying China as the aggressor. Foster Stockwell has kindly reminded us that a contrary assessment was provided by John Fairbank in 1971. Fairbank was an OSS operative during WWII and a highly respected professor of East Asian studies at Harvard University after the war. Excerpt of Professor Fairbank's commentary as provided by Stockwell is quoted below for the record.
How Aggressive is China?/ by John K. Fairbank, /The New York Review/, April 22, 1971 (pg. 6)
The border war was triggered when the Indians sent 2,500 troops, in summer uniforms and with only the equipment they could carry, across high passes north of the McMahon Line, with orders to assault Chinese bunkers that were heavily reinforced on the mountain ridges farther north. This truly suicidal project was denounced by some of the professional officers, who resigned on the spot, but was ordered by the political generals now in command. Supplying a post at 15,500 feet, for example, required a five-day climb by porters from the air strip, and on a ten-day round trip the porters could carry almost no payloads beyond what they needed for their own survival. Among 2,500 troops beyond the McMahon Line only two or three hundred had winter clothing and tents, and none had axes or digging tools, to say nothing of heavy guns and adequate ammunition. As ordered, they mounted a small attack, and the Chinese reacted and drove it back on October 10.
The Chinese reaction against the announced Indian buildup for an attack north of the McMahon Line initially produced in New Delhi not only the excitement of warfare but even euphoria. Chou En-lai’s proposal that everybody stop where they were and negotiate was again denounced as aggressive. Nehru said that China’s proposal “would mean mere existence at the mercy of an aggressive, arrogant and expansionist neighbor.” He began to accept American and British military aid as well as Russian. As Maxwell remarks, “It was almost forgotten that the Indian army had been about to take offensive action; ignored, that the government had refused to meet the Chinese for talks.” Meanwhile, after their initial reaction, the Chinese paused and built roads to supply their advanced positions, while the Indian forces were kept widely distributed in defenseless, small contingents, still in the belief that the Chinese would never dare to attack.
All this was resolved on November 17 when the Chinese did attack again and in three days overran or routed all the ill-supplied Indian forces in the field, east and west. Many brave Indian troops died at their posts and were found frozen there months later. India’s political generals behaved like headless chickens. The Indian defeat was complete. On November 21, l962, China announced a unilateral cease-fire and a withdrawal in the west by stages to positions twenty kilometers behind their lines of control and in the east to the north of the McMahon Line, so that they would hold essentially what they had been proposing for three years past.
But the Indian government, while accepting the cease-fire in fact, objected to the proposal publicly. Its forward policy was finished and two or three thousand Indian troops had been lost; but “no negotiations” was still the Indian policy “The border war, almost universally reported as an unprovoked Chinese invasion of India, had only confirmed the general impression that Peking pursued a reckless, chauvinistic and belligerent foreign policy.” China had won the match but India the verdict.
Inevitably Tibet will figure prominently in any conflict between China and India. Go to here for a comprehensive review of the issues on Tibet.
Most frequently, the cause of the border disputes is traced back to the border conflict fought between China and India in 1962, invariably portraying China as the aggressor. Foster Stockwell has kindly reminded us that a contrary assessment was provided by John Fairbank in 1971. Fairbank was an OSS operative during WWII and a highly respected professor of East Asian studies at Harvard University after the war. Excerpt of Professor Fairbank's commentary as provided by Stockwell is quoted below for the record.
How Aggressive is China?/ by John K. Fairbank, /The New York Review/, April 22, 1971 (pg. 6)
The border war was triggered when the Indians sent 2,500 troops, in summer uniforms and with only the equipment they could carry, across high passes north of the McMahon Line, with orders to assault Chinese bunkers that were heavily reinforced on the mountain ridges farther north. This truly suicidal project was denounced by some of the professional officers, who resigned on the spot, but was ordered by the political generals now in command. Supplying a post at 15,500 feet, for example, required a five-day climb by porters from the air strip, and on a ten-day round trip the porters could carry almost no payloads beyond what they needed for their own survival. Among 2,500 troops beyond the McMahon Line only two or three hundred had winter clothing and tents, and none had axes or digging tools, to say nothing of heavy guns and adequate ammunition. As ordered, they mounted a small attack, and the Chinese reacted and drove it back on October 10.
The Chinese reaction against the announced Indian buildup for an attack north of the McMahon Line initially produced in New Delhi not only the excitement of warfare but even euphoria. Chou En-lai’s proposal that everybody stop where they were and negotiate was again denounced as aggressive. Nehru said that China’s proposal “would mean mere existence at the mercy of an aggressive, arrogant and expansionist neighbor.” He began to accept American and British military aid as well as Russian. As Maxwell remarks, “It was almost forgotten that the Indian army had been about to take offensive action; ignored, that the government had refused to meet the Chinese for talks.” Meanwhile, after their initial reaction, the Chinese paused and built roads to supply their advanced positions, while the Indian forces were kept widely distributed in defenseless, small contingents, still in the belief that the Chinese would never dare to attack.
All this was resolved on November 17 when the Chinese did attack again and in three days overran or routed all the ill-supplied Indian forces in the field, east and west. Many brave Indian troops died at their posts and were found frozen there months later. India’s political generals behaved like headless chickens. The Indian defeat was complete. On November 21, l962, China announced a unilateral cease-fire and a withdrawal in the west by stages to positions twenty kilometers behind their lines of control and in the east to the north of the McMahon Line, so that they would hold essentially what they had been proposing for three years past.
But the Indian government, while accepting the cease-fire in fact, objected to the proposal publicly. Its forward policy was finished and two or three thousand Indian troops had been lost; but “no negotiations” was still the Indian policy “The border war, almost universally reported as an unprovoked Chinese invasion of India, had only confirmed the general impression that Peking pursued a reckless, chauvinistic and belligerent foreign policy.” China had won the match but India the verdict.
Inevitably Tibet will figure prominently in any conflict between China and India. Go to here for a comprehensive review of the issues on Tibet.
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